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Abstract
This intends to be a very empirical Essay. It lets the facts (legal facts, but facts nevertheless)
speak for themselves. Part I of this Essay first examines the not granting of national treatment by
European Union (”EU”)-and EU Member States’-law to companies controlled by third-country
nationals or other companies. Part II shows that bilateral investment treaties (”BITs”) concluded
by EU Member States do grant such national treatment horizontally and without any sectorial
exception (contrary to US BITs that do include a list of exceptions, as shown in Part III). Part
IV explains why BITs (not only EU Member States’ BITs, but all BITs) contradict Article II of
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (”GATS”). Part V argues that EU Member States’
BITs are contrary to the AETR-ERTA jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union
(”CJ” or “Court”) on the distribution of competences between the European Community (”EC” or
”Community”) and its Member States. Readers will have to assess whether the mess exists (and
whether it matters); if they agree that there is a mess, then they can proceed to Part VI, which tries
to identify who is to blame for it.
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To jean-Claude Piris, a lucid person
INTRODUCTION
This intends to be a very empirical Essay. It lets the facts
(legal facts, but facts nevertheless) speak for themselves. Part I of
this Essay first examines the not granting of national treatment by
European Union ("EU")-and EU Member States'-law to
companies controlled by third-countryl nationals or other
companies. Part II shows that bilateral investment treaties
("BITs") concluded by EU Member States do grant such national
treatment horizontally and without any sectorial exception
(contrary to US BITs that do include a list of exceptions, as
shown in Part III). Part IV explains why BITs (not only EU
Member States' BITs, but all BITs) contradict Article II of the
General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS"). Part V
argues that EU Member States' BITs are contrary to the AETR-
ERTA jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European
Union ("CJ" or "Court") on the distribution of competences
between the European Community ("EC" or "Community") and
its Member States.' Readers will have to assess whether the mess
exists (and whether it matters); if they agree that there is a mess,
then they can proceed to Part VI, which tries to identify who is to
blame for it.
I. THE EU AND ITS MEMBER STATES DO NOT GRANT
HORIZONTAL NATIONAL TREATMENT TO FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENTS ("FDIS") FROM THIRD COUNTRIES
The laws of the European Union3 and its Member States
frequently introduce differences of treatment between Member
States' companies (i.e., incorporated in accordance with the laws
of a Member State) depending on whether or not they are
controlled by third-country nationals or other companies. The
nature of, and the justification for, these differences in treatment
1. In the context of this Essay, "third country" means "non-EU Member State."
2. See infra notes 36-37.
3. The Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force in December 2009, merged the
European Community and the European Union into a single entity: the European
Union. From a historical perspective, all references in this Essay should be to the
European Community ("EC").
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vary according to the aims pursued by each specific set of
legislation. Two paradigmatic examples follow.
Article 9 of the Decision of the European Parliament and
Council Concerning the Implementation of a Programme of
Support for the European Audiovisual Sector (known as the
MEDIA Programme):
Legal and natural persons may be the beneficiaries of the
programme. Without prejudice to the agreements and
conventions to which the Community is a contracting party,
enterprises which benefit from the programme shall be owned and
shall continue to be owned, whether directly or by majority
participation, by Member States and/or Member State nationals.4
Article 4 of the Council Regulation on Licensing of Air
Carriers:
No undertaking shall be granted an operating licence by a
Member State unless:
its principal place of business and, if any, its registered office
are located in that Member State; and
its main occupation is air transport in isolation or combined
with any other commercial operation of aircraft or repair
and maintenance of aircraft.
Without prejudice to agreements and conventions to which
the Community is a contracting party, the undertaking shall be
owned and continue to be owned directly or through majority
ownership by Member States and/or nationals of Member States. It
shall at all times be effectively controlled by such States or such
nationals.'
Therefore, a company established in a Member State, but
owned, directly or by majority participation or ownership by
third-country nationals or companies, receives radically less
favorable treatment than companies owned by EU Member States
nationals or companies. Other examples of less favorable
treatment follow-and none of them are new.
Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of May 30, 1994 on the Conditions for Granting and
4. Parliament and Council Decision No. 1718/2006/EC Concerning the
Implementation of a Programme of Support for the European Audiovisual Sector
(MEDIA Programme), art. 9(1), 2006 O.J. L 327/12, at 17 (emphasis added).
5. Council Regulation 2407/92/EEC on Licensing of Air Carriers, art. 4, 1992 O.J.
L 240/2, at 2-3 (emphasis added).
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Using Authorizations for the Prospection, Exploration and
Production of Hydrocarbons: under Article 8(4) of that
Directive, a Member State may refuse an authorization, in certain
circumstances, "to an entity which is effectively controlled by the
third country concerned [pursuant to the preceding paragraphs
of the same Article] or by nationals of that third country;"6
Council Regulation (EC) 3283/94 of December 22, 1994 on
Protection against Dumped Imports from Countries Not
Members of the European Community and Council Regulation
(EC) 3284/94 of December 22, 1994 on Protection against
Subsidized Imports from Countries Not Members of the
European Community: by virtue of, respectively, Articles 4 and 6
of those Regulations, in certain circumstances Community
producers may be deemed not to be part of "Community
industry" if they are controlled, directly or indirectly, by third-
country undertakings;7
Council Regulation (EEC) 2343/90 of July 24, 1990 on
Access of Air Carriers to Scheduled intra Community Air Service
Routes and on the Sharing of Passenger Capacity between Air
Carriers on Scheduled Air Services between Member States, and
Council Regulation (EEC) 294/91 of February 4, 1991 on the
Operation of Air Cargo Services between Member States: under
Articles 2(e) and 2(b) respectively of those regulations, certain
air carriers from Member States do not benefit or benefit in a
limited way from the rights granted by these regulations if they
do not meet the condition that "the majority of [their] shares [of
capital] are and continue to be owned by Member States and/or
nationals of Member States and which is and continues to be
effectively controlled by such States or persons;"8
6. Parliament and Council Directive 94/22/EC on the Conditions for Granting and
Using Authorizations for the Prospection, Exploration and Production of Hydrocarbons,
art. 8(4), 1994 O.J. L 164/3, at 7.
7. Council Regulation 3283/94 on Protection against Dumped Imports from
Countries Not Members of the European Community, art. 4, 1994 O.J. L 349/1, at 8-9;
Council Regulation 3284/94 on Protection against Subsidized Imports from Countries
Not Members of the European Community, art. 6, 1994 O.J. L 349/22, at 30.
8. Council Regulation 2343/90 on Access of Air Carriers to Scheduled Intra
Community Air Service Routes and on the Sharing of Passenger Capacity between Air
Carriers on Scheduled Air Services between Member States, art. 2(e), 1990 O.J. L 217/8,
at 9; Council Regulation 294/91 on the Operation of Air Cargo Services between
Member States, art. 2(e), 1991 O.J. L 36/1, at 2. This restriction applies only to certain
air carriers not controlled by Member States or by nationals of Member States: those not
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Council Directive 90/435/EEC of July 23, 1990 on the
Common System of Taxation Applicable in the Case of Parent
Companies and Subsidiaries of Different Member States: the
purpose of the Directive is to set up more favorable tax rules
from which subsidiaries may benefit, provided at least twenty-five
percent of their capital is held by a parent company of a Member
State, but from which the subsidiaries of a parent company of a
third country that do not fulfil that condition may not benefit;9
Council Regulation (EEC) 2919/85 of October 17, 1985
Laying Down the Conditions for Access to the Arrangements
Under the Revised Convention for the Navigation of the Rhine
Relating to Vessels Belonging to the Rhine Navigation: under the
implementing regulation annexed thereto, less favorable
treatment is granted, in the cases provided for in Article 3, to
vessels whose owners are nationals of third countries that are not
contracting parties to the Revised Convention for the Navigation
of the Rhine.' 0
A detailed examination of the different EU Member States'
legislation from this perspective exceeds the limits of this Essay,
but it is worth highlighting a key detail that is often not
addressed. Within the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), the
Community and the Member States treat Member State
companies differently depending on whether or not they are
owned or controlled by third-country nationals or companies.
Indeed, Article XXVIII(k) to (n) of the GATS provides that
companies of a Member State, which are owned or controlled by
natural or juridical persons of a third country that is a WTO
member, are deemed to be third-country companies and not
companies of a Community Member State." As a result, in the
event of a dispute involving a subsidiary of a third-country
services company in a Member State of the EU, that subsidiary
covered by the provisions of Articles 2(e)(ii) and 2(b)(ii) respectively of these two
regulations.
9. Council Directive 90/435/EEC on the Common System of Taxation Applicable
in the Case of Parent Companies and Subsidiaries of Different Member States, 1977 O.J.
L 225/6.
10. Council Regulation 2919/85 Laying Down the Conditions for Access to the
Arrangements under the Revised Convention for the Navigation of the Rhine Relating
to Vessels Belonging to the Rhine Navigation, art. 3, 1985 O.J. L 280/4, at 4.
11. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, art. XXVIII(k)-(n),
1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1125[hereinafter GATS].
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will be deemed to be a "foreign" company rather than a
company of that Member State. The treatment under the GATS
of Member State companies owned or controlled by natural or
juridical persons of third countries is warranted and consistent
with the general thrust of that agreement; yet, this example is a
clear illustration of the basic difference in treatment between
Member State companies depending on the sole criterion of
ownership or control (by third country or by Member State
nationals or companies).
The CJ has had occasion to examine the treatment of
Member State companies depending on whether or not they are
controlled by third-country nationals or companies for
conformity with the Treaty Establishing the European
Community, particularly in its binding Opinion 2/92,
concerning the extent of and basis for the Community's powers
with respect to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development ("OECD") Council's Third Revised Decision
Concerning National Treatment.12 The purpose of that OECD
Council Decision is referenced in Opinion 2/92:
In the Revised Declaration, the OECD Member countries,
and-in matters falling within its competence-the
Community, express the intention to accord to undertakings
operating in their territories which are owned or controlled directly
or indirectly by nationals of another Member country, treatment
which is no less favourable than that accorded in like situations to
domestic undertakings, subject to certain exceptions and
derogations. In the Third Decision, the contracting parties
undertake, in particular, to comply with a procedure for
notification and examination, within the framework of the
OECD, of measures constituting exceptions to national
treatment, and any other measures which have a bearing on
national treatment.13
Neither the parties involved in the proceedings nor the CJ
defended, or even mentioned, the argument that rules that
12. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Third Revised
Decision of the Council Concerning National Treatment, OECD Doc. C(98) 210 FINAL (Nov.
12, 1998), available at http://acts.oecd.org/Instruments/PrintInstrumentView.aspx?
InstrumentlD=232&amp;InstrumentPID=227&InstrumentHID=0&amp;Lang=en (last
visited May 28, 2011).
13. Opinion on Competence of the Community or One of Its Institutions to
Participate in the Third Revised Decision of the OECD on National Treatment, Opinion
2/92, [1995] E.C.R. 1-521, i[3-4 (emphasis added).
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establish different treatment for Member State companies
depending on whether or not they are controlled by third-
country nationals or companies might be regarded as in breach
of the provisions of the Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community ("EEC Treaty"). 14 At no time was the
hypothesis that this question might be affected in one way or the
other by Article 58 of the EEC Treaty (later Article 48 of the
Treaty Establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty") and
current Article 54 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union ("TFEU")) either raised or defended.
In its opinion, the Court in no way calls into question the
compatibility of such difference in treatment with the EEC
Treaty. Quite the contrary: the "treatment to be accorded to
foreign-controlled undertakings" or "the conditions for the
participation of foreign controlled undertakings in the internal
economic life of the Member States in which they operate" were
regarded by the Court as open questions that can be and are in
practice regulated by national or Community legislation."
Thus, it goes without question that, at least in practice,
companies constituted under the legislation of the Member
States may be treated differently depending on whether or not
they are owned or controlled directly or indirectly by third-
country nationals or companies. The nature of and basis for any
such differences in treatment will depend on the content and
purpose the Community or Member States legislators intend to
give to each specific piece of legislation.
14. See id. EEC Treaty Article 58 states:
Companies constituted in accordance with the law of a Member State and
having their registered office, central management or main establishment
within the Community shall, for the purpose of applying the provisions of this
Chapter, be assimilated to natural persons being nationals of Member States.
The term "companies" shall mean companies under civil or commercial law
including co-operative companies and other legal persons under public or
private law, with the exception of non-profit-making companies.
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 58, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]; Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing
the European Community art. 48, 2006 O.J. C 321 E/27 [hereinafter EC Treaty];
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 54,
2010 O.J. C 83/47 [hereinafter TFEU].
15. See Opinion 2/92, [1995] E.C.R. 1-521, 24, 33.
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II. BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES SIGNED BY EU
MEMBER STATES GRANT HORIZONTAL NATIONAL
TREATMENT TO FDIS FROM THIRD COUNTRIES WITH NO
EXCEPTIONS 6
For example, Spain has been signing BITs" since 1989 with
a significant number of countries under the name of
"Agreements on Reciprocal Investment Promotion and
Protection" ("ARIPPs," or "APPRIs" in Spanish).18 In principle,
these agreements aim to foster and protect Spanish productive
investments overseas. They are mainly concluded with non-
OECD countries, with the declared purpose of providing greater
legal security for investors, through the establishment of rights
and guarantees additional to the ones already envisaged by the
domestic legislation of the signatory country. Spanish APPRIs are
nearly identical to those of other EU Member States and
completely identical in the point under discussion. As for their
content, APPRIs include rules related to their scope of
application, admission and treatment of investments,
expropriation, free transfer of payments, and other investment-
related funds, as well as state-to-state and investor-to-state dispute
settlement mechanisms.
The content of APPRIs goes well beyond the mere
protection and promotion of investment and creates broad
16. This issue, and the resulting incompatibility with EU law, have been raised in
Commission v. Finland, Case C-118/07, [2009] E.C.R. I (delivered Nov. 19, 2009)
(not yet reported). But the case addresses only a very minor aspect: the incompatibility
with the EC Treaty arising from the incompatibility between the horizontal liberalization
of movements of capitals, transfers, and payments granted in some BITs signed by
Finland before its accession to the EU and possible future restrictive measures to be adopted
by the Community/Union. Id. It 2, 19, 25. The Court, nevertheless, does not hesitate to
declare the incompatibility. Id. 50.
17. BITs are very interesting from a wider perspective: they accept as a principle
that private investors can launch international legal actions against foreign states without
even asking for permission from their own governments. What is highly contentious in
areas as human rights, for example, seems to be completely innocuous when it is in the
interest of investors. For background information on BITs, see generally KENNETH J.
VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: HISTORY, POLICY, AND INTERPRETATION
(2010).
18. The list of Spain's completed BITs can be found on the website of Spain's
Secretary of State of Foreign Trade. Acuerdos de Promoci6n y Proteccidn Reciproca de
Inversiones [Reciprocal Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements], GOBIERNO
DE ESPAfJA, http://www.comercio.mityc.es/comercio/bienvenido/Inversiones+
Exteriores/Acuerdos+Internacionales/APPRI/ListaAppris.htm (last updated Aug. 19,
2010).
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obligations regarding the treatment of investments. Not only do
they include regulations on fair and equitable treatment and full
protection and security, but they also introduce the principles of
national treatment ("NT") and most-favored-nation ("MFN")
status. Under these principles, foreign investors are to be
granted, at least in general terms, the same treatment as the one
granted to domestic investors, and the best treatment granted to
any other nation. Only two exceptions to these principles are
envisioned: privileges that any of the two contracting parties may
offer to investors from a third country within the context of a
customs union, a free trade area, a common market, or a
regional agreement (the "regional integration exception"); or
privileges resulting from an international taxation agreement.
The two agreements signed in October 1991 with Argentina
and Chile, for instance, envisage the principles of NT and MFN
in their Article IV, though with some differences in the
language.19 The two first paragraphs of Article IV of the Spain-
Chile agreement of 1991 read:
Each Party shall guarantee in its territory, in accordance with
its domestic laws, fair and equitable treatment of the
investments made by investors of the other Party, in
conditions which are not less favourable than those enjoyed
by its national investors.
This treatment shall not be less favourable than that which is
extended by each Party to the investments made in its
territory by investors of a third country.20
In the agreement with Argentina, the recognition of the NT
principle is not included in the first paragraph of Article IV, but
in the fifth, in the following terms (the first and the second
paragraphs refer, respectively, to fair and equitable treatment
19. Acuerdo Entre La Republica de Chile y El Reino de Espafia Para la Protecction
y Fomento Reciprocos de Inversiones [Agreement between Chile and Spain on
Reciprocal Protection of Investments], Chile-Spain, Oct. 2, 1991, available at
http://www.comercio.mityc.es/comercio/bienvenido/Inversiones+Exteriores/
Acuerdos+Internacionales/APPRI/ListaAppris.htm [hereinafter Spain-Chile Agreement
of 1991]; Acuerdo Para la Promocion y la Proteccion Reciproca de Inversiones Entre El
Reino de Espafia y La Republica Argentina [Agreement on Reciprocal Protection of
Investments between Spain and Argentina], Arg.-Spain, Oct. 3, 1991, available at
http://www.comercio.mityc.es/comercio/bienvenido/Inversiones+Exteriores/
Acuerdos+Internacionales/APPRI/ListaAppris.htm [hereinafter Spain-Argentina
Agreement of 1991].
20. Spain-Chile Agreement of 1991, supra note 19, art. 4(1)-(2).
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and to the MFN principle, in terms practically identical to the
ones used in the agreement between Spain and Chile):
'Notwithstanding the regulations on paragraph 2 of the present
article, each party will apply, in accordance with its domestic
regulations, to the investments of the investors of the other party,
a treatment not less favorable that the one extended to its own
investors. "21
As already pointed out from a general perspective, the
agreements with Chile or Argentina foresee only two exceptions
to the NT and MFN principles: the regional economic
integration exception and the taxation exception. Neither of the
two agreements includes a list of exceptions aimed at excluding
the application of the NT and MFN principles in certain
industrial and economic activities and in that sense, both
agreements respond to a standard model.
III. COMPARISON WITH BILATERAL OR REGIONAL
AGREEMENTS IN THE AMERICAS
BITs concluded by the United States (and Canada) present
two essential differences when compared to those concluded by
EU Member States. The first is well known: they cover not only
post-establishment but also access or first establishment, while
those of EU Member States cover only the post-establishment
phase. But the second remains surprisingly (or not?) unnoticed:
US BITs include a list of sectors carved out from the agreement.
This difference can be illustrated by comparing two bilateral
investment agreements to which Chile and Argentina are also
parties: the US-Argentina and the Canada-Chile BITs.
The US-Argentina BIT of November 14, 1991 devotes its
Article II to treatment, establishing standards, exceptions, and
other aspects.22 The first paragraph introduces the NT and MFN
clauses, but qualifies their application by indicating that both
principles are subject to the right of the parties to establish or
maintain exceptions in certain sectors of activity, listed in the
annexed Protocol. Parts 2 and 3 of the Protocol specify the US
exceptions to the NT obligation, and Part 4 enumerates the
21. Spain-Argentina Agreement of 1991, supra note 19, art. 4(5).
22. Treaty between United States of America and the Argentine Republic
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, U.S.-Arg., art.
2, Nov. 14, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-2 (1993).
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exceptions listed by the United States to both the NT and the
MFN clauses. Argentina reserves the right to establish or
maintain certain exceptions to the NT obligation (Part 5 of the
Protocol) as well.
Likewise, the bilateral investment agreement signed by
Canada and Chile on December 5, 1996 regulates the
commitments on NT and MFN in Chapter G (Articles G-02 and
G-03, respectively), but in a more detailed manner than the
agreements concluded by Spain.23 Article G-04 states that each
party will grant investors from the counterpart the best treatment
required by Articles G-02 and G-03. But what is particularly
interesting to the present analysis is the existence of another
article, G-08, which governs the reservations and exceptions to
the obligations stemming from the above mentioned articles.
Article G-08 refers to a series of lists attached as annexes to the
agreement. The first three annexes encompass the reservations
and exceptions to the NT and MFN clauses: Annex I:
Reservations for Existing Measures and Liberalization
Commitments; Annex II: Reservations with Respect to Future
Measures; and Annex III: Exceptions to the Most-Favored-Nation
Treatment.
The content and structure of the Canada-Chile Agreement
and, in particular, its regulation of investments, resemble the
North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"). 24 Part 5 of
NAFTA governs aspects related to investments, services and
related matters, devoting Chapter XI to investments. This
chapter is divided into two sections: Section A refers to
investments and Section B refers to dispute settlement between a
party and an investor of another party. The issues central to this
study are thus governed by Section A; in particular, by Articles
1102 and 1103, which refer to NT and MFN, respectively, and by
Article 1108, which refers to reservations and exceptions.
The first and second paragraphs of Article 1108 refer to
reservations with respect to measures currently in force and to
liberalization commitments. They stipulate that the NT and MFN
23. Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement, arts. G-02, G-03, Dec. 5, 1996, 36 I.L.M.
1067; see supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
24. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., §§ 101 (a) (1)-101(b),
Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA]; see infra notes
29-33.
13872011]
1388 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 34:1377
obligations, the performance requirements governed by Article
1106, or the restrictions on senior management and boards of
directors referred to in Article 1107, will not apply whenever
different inconsistent measures are maintained by different levels
of government (with some differences depending on whether the
implementing jurisdiction is the federal or local government). As
can be inferred from subparagraph (c), such measures cannot be
amended to widen the exceptions. The detailed relation of the
sectors and activities in which different treatment is feasible is
envisaged in the schedules of Annex I (and III in the case of
Mexico).
The third paragraph of Article 1108, in turn, enables
contracting states to establish new reservations in the future, but
only with respect to sectors, subsectors, or activities that were
listed in Annex 11, the underlying assumption being that the
need for new exceptions may arise that were not foreseen at the
time the agreement was signed. The limit to this possibility of
adopting discriminatory measures for foreign investors in the
future is established in the fourth paragraph: under no
circumstances may one of the parties request an investor of the
other party, by reason of its nationality, to sell or forego in any
other way an investment in existence when the measure enters
into force.
Besides reservations on current and future measures, the
fifth and sixth paragraphs of Article 1108 envisage the exceptions
that derive, respectively, from intellectual property rights and
other rights established by the treaties or with respect to the
sectors listed in Annex IV. Finally, NT and MFN apply neither to
purchases made by one party or a state enterprise, nor to
subsidies or other contributions (including credits, guarantees,
and insurances guaranteed by the government) that they may
grant.25
IV. EU MEMBER STATE BITS NOT ONLY CONTRADICT
EXISTING NATIONAL AND EU LEGISLA TION IN FORCE, BUT
ALSO, AS ALL BITS, CONTRADICT ARTICLE II OF THE GATS
As is well known, one of the main novelties of the 1994 WTO
agreements is the adoption of the General Agreement on Trade
25. NAFTA, supra note 24, art. 1108(7).
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in Services, as distinct from the General Agreement on Tarriffs
and Trade ("GATT") (even though, precisely to disguise this
fact, a very similar English acronym, GATS, was given in order to
give the impression that this was the GATT for services.) This is
the way it was understood in 1994 and 1995, and it is still often
understood now.
The scope of application of the GATS is determined by the
"four modes of supply of services" defined in Article I:
For the purposes of this Agreement, trade in services is
defined as the supply of a service:
(a) From the territory of one Member into the territory of
any other Member ("cross-border supply");
(b) In the territory of one Member to the service consumer
of any other Member ("consumption abroad");
(c) By a service supplier of one Member, through
commercial presence in the territory of any other Member
("commercial presence");
(d) By a service supplier of one Member, through presence
of natural persons of a Member in the territory of any other
Member ("movement of physical persons").26
These four modes of supply are completely heterogeneous.
(1) The fourth mode, "movement of physical persons," is not a
specific mode of supply, but rather a particular aspect of the
other three modes.27 As it was separated as a different mode,
restrictive measures concerning this aspect can also be put
together and separated without polluting liberalization in the
remaining three modes. (2) The first and second modes refer to
"international exchanges of services" as they have always been
defined by the balance of payments: the demand comes from the
importing country, the supply comes from the exporting
country.28 (3) The third mode, however, is only a fallacious way
of re-baptizing FDIs in the services sector. The supply of the
service is internal to the host country that receives the FDI and
26. CATS, supra note 11, art. 1.
27. The reader should try to construe an example of the fourth mode not involving
one of the other three. He or she will not be able to do it.
28. See Ramon Torrent & Martin Molinuevo, Keeping Multilateralism and Development
in Mind: Proposals for a New Model of North-South Agreements, in MULTILATERALISM AND
REGIONALISM: THE NEW INTERFACE 79, 89 (Mina Mashayekhi & Taisuke Ito eds., 2005).
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there is no need to face a foreign demand; it can be totally
directed to the internal demand.
Therefore, the first and the second modes on the one hand,
and the third mode on the other hand, originate problems
completely different from the legal, economic, and political
perspectives. From a legal perspective, the third mode raises very
complicated questions that are not raised by the first and second
modes: questions related to the post-establishment legal regime
of national firms under foreign control. This is the reason why
the GATS acquires some sort of universality in its scope: it covers
absolutely all the aspects of national legislation insofar as they
apply to firms under foreign control.
From a political perspective, the possible problem of foreign
control over the national economy is much more acute for the
third mode than for the first and second modes. In fact, this is
the main problem (or problem perceived as such) that underlies
the restrictions about access or national treatment relative to this
mode.
The GATT and the GATS are agreements completely
different with respect to their scope of application. This is a
fundamental reality that is not sufficiently emphasized. The
GATT looks at the product, whereas the GATS looks not only at
the product, but also (and mainly) at the producer. As a
consequence, as has already been noted in Part I, the GATS is
compelled to define the nationality of a firm, not in terms of the
place of establishment where its operations are made and whose
legislation is applied, but in terms of the nationality of the
physical or legal persons that control it. For example, for the
GATS, Telef6nica of Argentina is not an Argentinean
legal/juridical person, but a Spanish legal/juridical person (due
to the commercial presence in Argentina of Spain's
Telef6nica).29 Even if it is surprising at first sight, this is effectively
the result of the definitions of Article XXVIII of the agreement:
"J] uridical person of another Member" means a juridical
person which is either: (i) constituted or otherwise organized
under the law of that other Member, and is engaged in
substantive business operations in the territory of that
29. It is to be noted that, with this approach, the GATS departs from the well-
known jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice in Barcelona Traction, Light
and Power Co., (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5).
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Member or any other Member; or (ii) in the case of the supply
of a service through commercial presence, owned or controlled by: 1.
natural persons of that Member; or 2. juridical persons of that other
Member identified under subparagraph (i).3o
This is not the context to discuss in detail whether the
introduction of the notion of "trade in services" made by the
GATS has had poisonous effects over transparency and
conceptual clarity of the international legal framework of the
world economy. It suffices to point out, first, that it has created a
multilateral legal framework for foreign direct investment that is
different depending on whether the investments relate to the
provision of services (covered by the GATS) or the production of
goods (not covered by any multilateral agreement), an approach
that does not make any economic sense (above all when goods-
producing firms are increasingly diversifying toward the
provision of services), and, second, that it has given an alibi for
not developing an acceptable multilateral regime on FDI in all
sectors.
What does matter here is that the GATS has added an
additional element of contradiction to the multilateral and
bilateral international agreements, mainly those on investment.
Indeed, Article II of the GATS creates a horizontal obligation to
grant MFN treatment to services and service providers from any
other WTO member:
1. With respect to any measure covered by this Agreement,
each Member shall accord immediately and unconditionally
to services and service suppliers of any other Member
treatment no less favourable than that it accords to like
services and service suppliers of any other country.
2. A Member may maintain a measure inconsistent with
paragraph 1 provided that such a measure is listed in, and
meets the conditions of, the Annex on Article II
Exemptions .3.. .1
The horizontal obligation established by Article 11.1 applies
to FDI in the services sectors (re-baptized as "commercial
presence" or "mode 3" by the GATS Article 1). Therefore, it is
clear that BITs, which also cover horizontal FDI in the service
sectors, violate that provision, unless they are included in the
30. GATS, supra note 11, art. XXVIII (emphasis added).
31. Id. art. II.
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corresponding list of exceptions envisaged by Article 11.2, or
unless they are considered an agreement of "Economic
Integration" covered by the exception on economic integration
of the GATS Article V, a consideration that makes absolutely no
sense taking into account BITs' very limited scope and goals.
It is sometimes argued that this interpretation of the GATS
Article II is incorrect because it was agreed during the Uruguay
Round of negotiations that BITs remained outside the scope of
the GATS. This argument does not hold. First, no negotiating
history is able to deprive a provision of what it clearly and
unambiguously states. Second, the argument is factually wrong,
and the best evidence for it lies in the fact that the BITs signed by
some WTO members appear, in whole or part, in their respective
lists of exceptions. This proves that they were very conscious that
BITs were not kept outside the scope of the GATS.
To this author's knowledge, this contradiction between the
GATS and BITs was analyzed in writing for the first time in 2003
in a pioneering article by Marina Sole, published in the Revista
Brasileira de Comdrcio Exterior [Brazilian Journal of International
Trade].32 The argument was also developed in another
pioneering work: the 2003-2006 International Relations Master's
thesis of Martin Molinuevo.33 This Essay's author also raised the
issue in 2006 at the tenth World Trade Forum organized by the
World Trade Institute in Bern. As a result of the discussion in
Bern, the WTO Secretariat conducted research, the result of
which can be found in Adlung and Molinuevo's 2008 paper
"Bilateralism in Services Trade: Is There Fire behind the (BIT-)
Smoke?"3 4 In the meantime, Pedro da Motta Veiga had also
raised the issue in 2007.35
32. Marina Solh, Regulagno no ambito nacional, bilateral, regional e multilateral. Por que
tanta confusdo? [Regulation at the National, Bilateral, Regional and Multilateral Levels. Why
the Confusion?], REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE COMtRCIO EXTERIOR, Jan.-Mar. 2003, at 28.
33. Martin Molinuevo, WTO Disciplines on Foreign Investment, Wasn't the GATS
about Trade in Services? (2002-2003) (unpublished MA thesis, University of Bologna)
(available at http://phasel.nccr-trade.org/images/stories/publications/Molinuevo.
Tesis%20UniBo.Wasnt%2Othe%20GATS%20about%20trade.pdf).
34. Rudolf Adlung & Martin Molinuevo, Bilateralism in Services Trade: Is There Fire
Behind the (BIT-)Smoke?, 1IJ. INT'L ECON. L. 2 (2008).
35. Pedro da Motta Veiga, The International Regime on Investments: A
Problematic Status Quo, an Uncertain Future, International Seminar: The New Agenda
for International Trade Relations as the DOHA Round Draws to an End, Barcelona,
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As Adlung and Molinuevo's paper is written from the WTO
perspective, the presentation is different: instead of concluding
that BITs violate Article II of the GATS, it concludes that Article
II of the GATS "dissolves" all BITs because they have to be
"multilateralized" in application of it. Whatever the presentation,
the facts are clear: BITs and the GATS overlap contradictorily.
V. THE BITS OFEUMEMBER STATES VIOLATE THE AETR-
ERTA JURISPRUDENCE ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF
COMPETENCES BETWEEN THE EU AND ITS MEMBER STATES
The CJ's well established AETR-ERTA jurisprudence 6 holds
that the internal exercise of a non-exclusive Community
competence gives birth to an external exclusive competence of the
Community in order to undertake international obligations
whose scope overlaps with that of the existing internal rules.37
The series of Open Skiesjudgments of the Court ofJustice make
the meaning of the AETR-ERTA jurisprudence absolutely clear.38
The scopes of internal Community and international rules (in
the sense of legal relations covered by each of them) must be
carefully compared. If they overlap (but only to the exact extent
in which specific provisions of the international agreement and
of internal pieces of legislation do overlap)," the Community has
Spain, Jan. 29-30, 2005, available at http://www.iadb.org/intal/aplicaciones/uploads/
ponencias/Foro_ AUSPINTAL_2007_01 01_MOTTAVEIGA.pdf.
36. Commission v. Council (AETR-ERTA), Case 22/70, [1971] E.C.R. 263.
37. The meaning of the AETR-ERTA jurisprudence is examined in RAMON
TORRENT, DERECHO Y PRACTICA DE LAS RELACIONES ECONOMICAS EXTERIORES DE LA
UNION EUROPEA [LAW AND PRACTICE OF EXTERNAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION] (1998). The arguments presented are those developed during the
1990s by the Legal Service of the Council of the European Union. They coincide exactly
with those developed by the Court in the Open Skiesjurisprudence.
38. See Commission v. United Kingdom, Case C-466/98, [2002] E.C.R. 1-9427;
Commission v. Denmark, Case C-467/98, [2002] E.C.R. 1-9519; Commission v. Sweden,
Case C-468/98, [2002] E.C.R. 1-9575; Commission v. Finland, Case C-469/98, [2002]
EC.R. 1-9627; Commission v. Belgium, Case C-471/98, [2002] E.C.R. 1-9681;
Commission v. Luxembourg, Case C-472/98, [20021 E.C.R. 1-9741; Commission v.
Austria, Case C-475/98, [2002] E.C.R. 1-9797; Commission v. Germany, Case C-476/98,
[2002] E.C.R. 1-9855; see also Court of Justice Press Release, 89/02 (Nov. 5, 2002),
available at http://curia.europa.eu/en/actu/communiques/cp2/aff/cp28 9 en.htm.
39. I.e., the AETR-ERTA effect must be analyzed "provision by provision" and not
merely by considering whether the general subject matter of the international
agreement and the internal piece of legislation overlap.
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acquired an exclusive external competence and the Member
States have lost theirs.
But there is no doubt that the Community has largely
exercised (and for a very long time) its nonexclusive internal
competence in areas of post-establishment covered by the
horizontal provisions on fair and equitable treatment, national
treatment, and most-favored-nation treatment included in the
BITs of Member States. These internal Community rules are not
carved out from the BITs. Therefore, only one conclusion is
possible: in accordance with the AETR-ERTA jurisprudence, the
EU Member States do not have, and have not had for a rather
long time, the competence to sign horizontal agreements on
post-establishment that, because of their horizontality, cover
areas also internally covered by Community rules.
VI. WHO IS GUILTY OF SUCH A MESS?
A. The First Culprit: Ideology
In this author's opinion (and professional experience while
working in the Legal Service of the Council), the first main
culprit of such a mess, and in particular, the explanation of why
no list of exceptions is included in EU Member States' BITs, is a
purely ideological interpretation of Article 58 of the EEC Treaty
(later Article 48 of the EC Treaty, and current Article 54 of the
TFEU), became dogma. The article says:
Companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a
Member State and having their registered office, central
administration or principal place of business within the
Union shall, for the purposes of this Chapter, be treated in
the same way as natural persons who are nationals of
Member States.40
This provision was construed as creating an absolute
obligation of national treatment toward FDI in EU Member
States. It is very easy to see, simply by reading the provision, that
it says nothing of the sort. The provision is not easy to
understand because treating companies "in the same way as
natural persons" is senseless, precisely because companies and
natural persons are of a completely different nature. But the
40. TFEU, supra note 14, art. 54, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 69.
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provision makes sense when its historical context is taken into
account. During the negotiations of the Treaty of Rome in 1956,
one of the greatest achievements was the agreement to grant
horizontal national treatment to natural persons from one
Member State established in another Member State. Once this
was achieved, the question arose as to whether this national-
treatment obligation also applied when the natural persons
operated through companies that they owned and controlled.
And this was also achieved in Article 58 of the Treaty of Rome.
However, all the discussions concerned nationals of Member
States and companies controlled by them! At no point did the
idea come about to extend to nationals from third-countries (or
companies controlled by them) this national-treatment
obligation. One must remember in this respect that, as the Court
has repeatedly recognized, the chapter on right of establishment,
which contains the provision, is introverted and looks only to
relations and operations between Member States, unless some rule
applicable to operations with third countries is enacted through
secondary law.
But that groundless interpretation served very well two
ideological objectives: the first, that of transforming the EEC
Treaty into a powerful instrument of external economic relations
liberalization in favor of third-country capitals and companies;
and the second, that of creating an additional restriction for
Member States' policies, an objective that, for some defenders of
European integration, constitutes an end in itself (more
important, even, than that of developing EC policies).
In 1996, an opinion of the Legal Service of the Council on
"Provisions of the EC Treaty applicable to investment from third
countries" demolished the dogma, both on empirical and on
analytical grounds. 41 The opinion had an enormous diffusion
and repercussion, not only in Brussels, but also in Washington,
where it was immediately known, as well as in Paris, where the
negotiations of the OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment
were going on, and in Geneva, where the negotiations on Basic
Telecoms after the Uruguay Round were also well advanced.
The opinion prompted a profound discussion within the
Legal Service of the European Commission. Led by its Director
41. Council, Opinion of the Legal Service on the Provisions of the EC Treaty
Applicable to Investment from Third Countries, 6393/96 Ext. 1,JUR 106.
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General, the Commission's Legal Service came about with a full
reinterpretation of the dogma, which maintained its restrictive
effects toward Member States' ability to maneuver when adopting
economic policies, but liberated the Community from them.
According to it, Article 48 EC Treaty created for Member States
an obligation of granting national treatment to companies
owned or controlled by third-country nationals or companies, but
this obligation did not apply to the European Community when
enacting secondary legislation.42 For years this interpretation
remained quite hidden in the Commission's inner-most circles,
but it finally came to the fore on September 22, 2003 in a so-
called "Understanding Concerning Certain U.S. Bilateral
Investment Treaties, signed by the U.S., the European
Commission and acceding and candidate countries for accession
to the European Union," negotiated in the framework of the
OECD.43 Its Annex G is an "Explanation Provided by the
European Commission concerning the Scope and Operation of
Article 48 of the EC Treaty," which, in rather cumbersome
language, states the reinterpretation of the dogma. The only
absolutely clear sentence is at the end:
Article 48 does not prevent the EC legislator to provide for
different treatment of third country companies and firms according
to their ownership in the pursuit of a common policy or when
adopting measures under specific treaty provisions (e.g.,
Article 57.2 EC). The provision would however not allow the EC
legislator to authorise individual Member States to adopt measures
which are not consistent with that Article.44
The reader should not waste much time trying to discover
the legal basis for such an extraordinary interpretation of Article
48. There is none. The only possible analysis of the interpretation
is the just-summarized historical one. 4 5
42. Id.
43. Understanding Concerning Certain U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties, signed
by the U.S., the European Commission, and Acceding and Candidate Countries for
Accession to the European Union, Sept. 22, 2003, available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/
2003/44366.htm.
44. Id. annex G (emphasis added).
45. See Ramon Torrent, Derecho comunitario e Inversiones extranjeras directas: Libre
circulacian de capitales vs. Regulaci6n no discriminatoria del establecimiento. De la golden share
a los nuevos open skies [European Community Law and Foreign Direct Investments: Free
Circulation of Capitals vs. Non Discriminatory Regulation of Establishment: From the Golden
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B. The Second Culprit: Professional Practices
Ideology is not the only culprit. All the facts analyzed in this
Essay are very old and very easy to discover. Some of them have
already been discussed in writing and, in any case, are
undoubtedly important. How and why did-and do-they come
as a surprise to even highly informed interlocutors? And why,
after the surprise, did-and do-they fall into oblivion with such
vertiginous rapidity? How is it possible that EU Member States
have for years signed and implemented (and continue to do so)
BITs that they systematically violate (in application of
Community/EU law!)? How is it possible that officials,
politicians, and experts in developing countries (and plenty of
NGOs and institutes in developed countries), many of whom
militate against BITs, have not raised the issues discussed in this
Essay?
The answers to these questions fall much more within the
realm of sociology and political science than within that of an
essay in a law journal. However, there is a legal practice that
underlies the answers to these questions: that of "copying and
pasting" international agreements and parts of them. This
practice, whose negative consequences do not need to be
emphasized, has much more explanatory power than other well
established explanations of the similarities in BITs, such as the
collective action problems that developing countries would
supposedly face as a result of their intense competition for the
attraction of foreign investment. According to this view,
developing countries would be trapped in a "prisoner's
dilemma" that would drag them into costly bidding wars in which
they would progressively increase concession proposals offered to
potential investors.46 This author has discussed elsewhere 47 why
Share to the New Open Skies Agreements], 22 REVISTA ESPAfJOLA DE DERECHO EUROPEO 283
(2007) (Spain).
46. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining
the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 669-74 (1997);
CHARLES OMAN, OCED, DEVELOPMENT CENTRE STUDIES: POLICY COMPETITION FOR
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: A STUDY OF COMPETITION AMONG GOVERNMENTS TO
ATTRACT FDI (1999), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/28/352 7 5189.pdf.
47. See Ramon Torrent & Federico Lavopa, Strengthening Enforcement of Core Labor
Rights: Can a New Investment Agreement Model Help Multinational Corporations Be More
Socially Responsible?, in CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN LATIN AMERICA: A
COLLECTION OF RESEARCH PAPERS FROM THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE
AND DEVELOPMENT VIRTUAL INSTITUTE NETWORK (2010), available at
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seemingly sophisticated collective-action explanations should
possibly be abandoned in favor of much more realistic
explanations based in the invisible inertial power exerted by the
repetitive utilization of authentic templates or models of
international investment agreements (and other agreements).
These templates have appeared within a certain context, partly as
the product of improvisation, and have remained in place long
afterwards.
This resilience should not be surprising. Even leaving aside
the well-known temptation of copying in order not to assume the
risky and time- and effort-consuming responsibility of thinking,
once the exhausting task of reaching an agreement on a text
between the numerous national and subnational agencies
involved in the design of one of these agreements has been
accomplished, there are strong incentives to use this text as a
model for subsequent negotiations. This is especially true in the
case of investment treaties, which generally envisage a most-
favored-nation clause. A country has little motivation to
customize agreements containing such a clause, since it
automatically extends to its counterpart a treatment equal to the
one provided for in the most favorable clause of all the
agreements it has signed.
CONCLUSION
National and, in particular, EU regional rules clearly violate
bilateral international agreements concluded by EU Member
States. Bilateral agreements concluded not only by EU Member
States but also by other developed countries, beginning with the
US and Canada, clearly violate the only multilateral agreement
overlapping with them: the GATS. And all this in an area so
important as foreign direct investment. The ones who behave
like this internationally are not small developing countries but
the big players with very powerful technocracies (in the public
and the private sectors as well as in the academia).
This should not come as a surprise after having discovered
that these very same actors were not aware that an enormous
financial crisis was looming in the mid-2000s. But it should lead
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/dtlktcd20lO2_en.pdf (providing a detailed discussion
on the impact of templates in international investment negotiations and agreements).
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everyone to a deep revision of existing approaches (in policy as
well as in academia). If the revision does not take place, the
world (and mankind) will continue to lack the necessary legal,
institutional, and political means to govern economic
globalization in a reasonable manner.
